Abstract. Despite criticism in the wake of the GFC, history shows that theory and curricula adapt to rectify any disconnects between theory, curricula, and practice. Finance theory unquestionably has antecedents in economics, accounting, legal theory, and psychology. Some theoretical developments-including the moral hazard consequences of limited liability-have yet to filter through to many texts and curricula, which also omit explanations of uncertainty; incomplete and (sub)optimal contracting; contagion; and behavioural finance. Student learning outcomes could be enhanced if universities, perhaps in a final year, cross-disciplinary "capstone" course, empowered students to understand the financial documentation evidencing sophisticated transactions; map relevant cash flows and wealth transfers; and recognise Ponzi schemes, the ethics of stakeholder wealth transfers, the conditions for contagion, and incentives for adverse selection and moral hazard in practice.
Introduction
Finance curricula in Universities have been criticized in the financial press in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) for over-emphasizing the efficient market theory 1 and rational expectations 2 at the expense of ignoring the ethics of human behaviour. This article identifies key aspects of finance theory that relate to many of the complex financial securitization transactions, which before the GFC were underemphasized in most tertiary finance studies. 4 It suggests that the usefulness of finance curricula-and students' learning outcomes-in future could be considerably enhanced by their prominent inclusion in core and "capstone" courses. 5 Using a cross-disciplinary approach, finance students could be empowered to:
i. Read the publicly available disclosure documents evidencing sophisticated financial products and transactions in practice, with a view to:
• mapping the cash flows and wealth transfers between stakeholders;
• if appropriate, re-arranging the cash flows to derive new financial products and verify whether these would breach the law; and ii. Recognise:
• the moral hazard effects of limited liability conferred by corporations legislation, 6 and all the checks and balances which become necessary as a consequence;
• the ethical implications of transferring wealth from security holders to management or the Board, or between classes of security holders;
• the conditions under which contagion between stakeholder groups could occur; and
• the incentives for adverse selection and moral hazard in particular schemes in practice.
By doing so, not only would students' learning outcomes be enhanced, but we could be better assured that future students might later contribute to articulating a finance theory that encompasses these realities. The emphasis of the article is therefore primarily pedagogical. It addresses finance theory only insofar as this is necessary to enhance teaching and learning outcomes. The recommended changes relate not so much to what content is taught, but how to teach it and what is emphasized.
In order to further identify these key aspects of theory, however, we must first examine how we got to this point.
How Did We Get Here? Quomodo hic habetur?
The GFC was characterized chiefly by the following:
• It was claimed to be a unique event, 8 which which suggests uncertainty as distinct from risk simpliciter;
• Some firms, apparently "too big to fail", were bailed out by government, 9 suggesting moral hazard;
• As a result of their remuneration packages, management's incentives were often to undertake highly risky investments 10 of which major shareholders, were they aware, would not approve. This is suggestive of incomplete and/or sub-optimal contracting; and the selection of • Losses spread between institutions and even countries, apparently evidencing a contagion effect;
• Legal arrangements and documentation for securitizations and other financing schemes which were so complex that even "sophisticated investors" (as legally defined) failed to understand the risks and uncertainties involved, 11 suggesting information asymmetry or ignorance, and possibly even incomplete or sub-optimal contracting issues;
• Overconfidence, and a persistent (published) belief or opinion that everything would be all right, 12 which raises behavioural finance issues such as belief perseverance; and
• Arguably, a lack of ethics. 13 It is true that these features of the GFC would be recognized in many extant curricula not as finance, but as economics; law and accounting theory; psychology; and/or philosophy. However, the problem for extant curricula, which depend for their development on journals and textbooks, 14 is that while leading finance journals are now (and have some time been) addressing these developments in practice, most finance textbooks and curricula are not-and while it may take around a further eight years for curricula to catch up, 15 finance students would greatly benefit from an understanding of these issues now.
In an effort to understand how we got to this point, the following section traces the intellectual lineage of finance theory as presented in current textbooks 787-810 at 801-802. 14. In finance, as in many disciplines, the chief source of new ideas is scholarly journal articles, whose content and essential reasoning are later published in textbooks, which form the basis for teaching curricula. Often (though not always), changes in curricula then encroach on and influence finance practice, in a manner reminiscent of Keynes' "practical men" who are beholden for their ideas to "some academic scribbler of a few years back": cf. Keynes, J. M. There is apparently a misconception that finance theory, like Aphrodite, emerged fully formed 18 with the publication of Harry Markowitz' 1952 article on portfolio management, 19 or at the latest in 1969 with the publication by Gene Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael Jensen, and Richard Roll of their event study on stock price reactions to news. 20 Certainly it is true that modern empirics emerged around this time, but that was largely due to technological advances in data processing. Before this time, some argue, earlier economists were so well versed in practical institutions, history and data that they did not need to be so "empirical" in today's sense of that term. 21 Finance theory has its roots in ancient Greece around c. 624 B.C. -c. 546 B.C., when Aristotle observed speculation in olive oil futures options. 22 Traders in the Roman Empire were familiar with bubbles and busts, public issues of debt and equity securities, investment and lending with interest, bills of exchange, trade finance, and even the formation of some joint stock companies. 23 The Arabs preserved much of the ancient Greek and Egyptian literature during the mediaeval period. Trade finance and taxation flourished during the Renaissance. 24 
Adam
Smith records that the industrial revolution saw the rise of joint stock companies. 25 The late 1700s to early 1800s also saw the rise of public markets for investment securities 26 issued for new infrastructure projects. 27 Modern finance theory has its antecedents primarily in economics and accounting theory. Economics was itself influenced early by psychology and biology, 28 while modern accounting theory owes much to economics, 29 Finance theory unquestionably therefore has its antecedents in economics, accounting theory, legal theory, and psychology. In terms of curriculum reform in the wake of the GFC, one relevant issue is the extent to which these crossdisciplinary roots ought be explicitly recognized and utilized.
Historical Development of Finance Curricula
The archiving of university finance curricula is notoriously haphazard. On the assumption that the content of finance curricula from the late 19 th century to the present reflects the leading finance textbooks of the time, this section reviews the way in which curricula developed in response to theoretical developments and market needs. Unsurprisingly, theory, texts and curricula have historically responded to and developed after periods of change-often, turmoil-in the financial markets. 59 Textbook writers from 1862 to the 1920s engaged in largely descriptive works, seeking to synthesize and organize the lessons of practical industry experience. 60 The first textbooks-in the modern sense of that term-for finance students were Green's Corporate Finance (1897); 61 and Carroll's Principles and Practice of Finance (1895). 62 These books concentrated on external corporate financing, including stocks and bonds, corporate accounting, railroad reports, corporate reorganization and public policy issues.
The Roaring 1920s was dominated by five texts: 63 Smith on common stocks; 64 Dewing on corporate financial policy; 65 Gerstenberg on financial organization; 66 Chamberlain on bond investment; 67 and as a direct response to the needs of the time, Bogen on railroad securities. 68 All of these texts continued the work of synthesizing and organizing finance knowledge begun by the early writers of the late 19 th century. These books, and the finance curricula on which they were based, were heavily institutional and intensely detailed, spawning (in finance practice) much meticulous statistical work the purpose of which was to identify particular stocks as profitable investments. 69 Much of this exhaustive statistical work became discredited in 1929 following the Wall Street collapse, which heralded an enveloping disenchantment with common stocks as long-term investments. Abandonment of the gold standard by Britain stimulated some, albeit very limited interest in gold stocks as hedges against inflation but, before 1934, there was a widely held view that common stocks were mere speculations, though bonds were "investments". 70 The conventional wisdom was that financing could be learned "on the job". Stock analysts who lacked inside information 71 attempted to forecast business conditions and business cycles. 72 Graham and Dodd's (1934) Security Analysis 73 made an immense contribution by re-emphasizing that it was possible to make sound investments in common stocks. Graham and Dodd distinguished between what would now be termed "market risk" and "specific risk", and used accounting data and other techniques to identify stocks' "earning power". They believed at the time that diversification among primary stocks would not offer very fruitful opportunities for analysis. 74 The organizing and synthesizing phase in the development of finance curricula lasted until the post-World War II reconstruction era, when changes in core finance curricula were brought about by four key influences.
The first was a growing recognition, in both the U.S. 75 and Britain, 76 of a mismatch between the content of finance curricula and the requirements of finance practice. The textbooks of the period were very heavily institutional in detail, and contrast greatly with later texts of the 1980s and 90s-demonstrating how much finance theory has been revolutionized since 1947. The second key factor was that, after the War, corporates were forced to rely significantly on internal funds to finance their operations. 77 Two conferences reported in the Journal of Finance in 1949 and 1950 about a need to focus on issues concerning working capital and internal financial operations, 78 and gradually over the decade these topics became embedded in core finance curricula and texts. 79 Thirdly, there was a growing recognition that finance curricula had become "too [institutionally]complex, too encyclopedic, too demanding of memory at the expense of intellect". 80 Fourth, analytical techniques developed during the War such as mathematical modeling, statistical testing, and operations research began to be used in finance, enabling scholars to empirically test hypotheses within a more theoretical framework. There was gradual recognition that the pre-War literature which had so well synthesized and organized the lessons of practice was useful for suggesting hypotheses, but inadequate for testing them in any systematic way. 81 During the 1950s, interest in consumer finance increased, 82 but it was in the 1960s and 70s that the most innovative theoretical advances in finance thought came to fruition. 83 In 1970, observed Brennan, one of the (then) "new generation" of theoreticians, the primary consideration of finance theory (and, it could be added, curricula) was how the value of a given cash flow stream might be changed by 54 distributing it among different classes of security holders. 84 By the mid-1990s, however, concern had shifted-largely as a result of insights from agency theory and real option pricing theory that arise under conditions of information asymmetry-to how the structure of claims on the firm affected the cash flow stream itself. 85 This shift is apparent from a perusal of many of the best-known textbooks over this period. 86 The move to a more "theoretical" finance theory was largely a reaction to the institutional "fussiness" (to use Brennan's phrase) of previous eras, exemplified by Dewing's Corporate Finance and later editions of Graham, Dodd and Cottle's Security Analysis. In this sense, the new theoretical finance "was in itself a 'back to basics' movement, ... relegating institutional details to footnotes." 87 Whether the "return to basics" movement has given way to an overly mathematical and empirical approach to finance remained somewhat of a vexed question. While there is some merit in the suggestion, it must be remembered that economics, psychology and even (some) legal analysis has also become highly mathematical and empirical in nature. We are abstracting from an ever more complex world.
Despite substantial disruptions to financial markets, 88 history shows that theory and curricula both adapt to rectify disconnects between them and practice. 89 The challenge for contemporary finance theorists 90 and educationalists is to identify any disconnects between theory, curricula and practice; and to evaluate the best way to proceed in terms of theory, curriculum development, and student learning outcomes.
Disconnects Between Theory, Curricula, and Practice
The features of the GFC noted earlier 91 would be recognized in many extant university curricula not as finance, but as the subject of other disciplines. For example, contagion, moral hazard, adverse selection, and uncertainty are often seen to be the province of economics. Issues concerning incomplete and optimal contracting are frequently seen to relate purely to law and legal analysis. Behavioural finance issues such as anchoring and belief perseverance are perceived to be within the realm of applied psychology, while the last factor is usually seen as a matter of ethics or moral philosophy. There is no denying that it is helpful and entirely legitimate to view such issues through different lenses. However, what is surprising-indeed, perhaps disturbing if our graduate learning outcomes include content that is relevant and useful-is the conspicuous absence of these issues from many of existing university finance curricula.
There would appear to be two reasons for this. The first is that we do not yet have a single unified theory that explains and predicts finance practice, but rather a number of sometimes complementary, sometimes competing "piecemeal" theories. Consider, for example, capital structure and dividend policy-we have not one theory, but several. Similarly, many finance academics seeking to explain the GFC to their students may feel somewhat hampered by our current lack of a unified theory which encompasses and explains the main characteristics of the GFC, including contagion, moral hazard, adverse selection, uncertainty, incomplete and optimal contracting, behavioural finance issues and, perhaps, a lack of ethics.
The second is that most finance textbooks are not addressing these developments in practice-and it is the leading textbooks on which many finance curricula rely for their content and pedagogy. This is despite the fact that leading finance journals are now (and have been for some time) addressing these developments in practice, notwithstanding our lack of a single completely unifying theory to explain the GFC. For example, more than 15 years ago, Brennan noted the importance of incomplete and sub-optimal contracting and legal arrangements. 92 The concept of socially optimal liquidation, for example, would appear to be directly relevant to corporate collapses during the GFC. At the same time, Brennan referred to a growing theoretical and empirical finance literature on adverse selection, signalling and screening in the markets; moral hazard and agency in the theory of the corporation; corporate bankruptcy under conditions of asymmetric information and free rider problems; and capital allocation decisions. 93 All of these topics would appear to be directly relevant to issues surrounding the GFC, and yet few have been incorporated into university finance curricula, even in the aftermath of the GFC.
Where to from Here? Quo hinc?
So...quo hinc? In terms of workable revisions to enhance the relevance of finance curricula in the wake of the GFC, a number of key changes readily come to mind -albeit changes which would require, to some extent, the use of a multidisciplinary approach which applies complementary aspects of finance, economics, psychology, law and accounting scholarship.
Highlighting the Importance of Uncertainty
First, there could be a greater emphasis on techniques for ex ante recognising uncertainty, as distinct from risk, without significant disruption to the curriculum. Extant finance curricula generally do a good job of helping students to learn the most popular methods of analysing uncertainty, such as rank dependence 94 (e.g. best-to-worst case scenarios), prospect theory, 95 Bayesian models, 96 and multiple priors. 97 However, university finance curricula are generally not so good at helping students to identify and map sources of substantial uncertainty, as distinct from risk; and conventional risk/return models such as the capital asset pricing model do not-at least as traditionally taught-capture ex ante uncertainty, which remains the elephant in the room. Whereas risk can be quantified using exogenous, objectively known probabilities (useful for risk-return models), such probabilities are inherently almost impossible to determine for unique events 98 such as a GFC, or the fallout for individual firms arising from it. Uncertainty, with unknown probabilities, can be assessed only subjectively. As part of a reformed curriculum, the events culminating in the GFC, together with its attendant uncertainties, provide a matchless set of case studies, directly on point, which students could use in the classroom to identify and map the main sources and impacts of uncertainty.
4.2.
Reducing Complexity and Information Asymmetry by Broadening Knowledge Through a Cross-Disciplinary Approach A second and related shortcoming is that, because of information asymmetry and agency costs which are spread across an interconnected network of contracts both inside and outside the firm, financial intermediaries can extract rents for, and transfer wealth to, themselves by increasing the complexity of new securities and products they issue. 99 A high level of complexity in financial products and transactions in the face of investor and market ignorance amplifies the effects of uncertainty.
Much of this product innovation was presumably a consequence of financiers seeking to circumvent legal and regulatory proscriptions, with the result that greater complexity and extensive mandated disclosure, rather than clarifying, apparently obfuscated the understanding even of many "sophisticated investors". 100 Concepts such as "deferred equity", "equity bridges", "rolling instalment warrants", credit default swaps, collateralised debt obligations, and "performance dividends" are not found in most texts or curricula, despite their prevalence in practice. People have limited capacity to absorb information unless they are given a sufficiently long time to process it: they exhibit "bounded" rationality. 101 Greater disclosure cannot guarantee understanding; understanding requires education and learning. 102 In the context of securitisation particularly, providers of complex financial products make their money by exploiting the information asymmetry and agency costs that are spread across the network of contracts both inside and outside the firm, 103 in the form of economic rents and wealth transfers. There is little pedagogical reason why the financial economic theory underlying wealth transfers should not be taught to students from a prudential investment perspective-they are, after all, tomorrow's investors or investment advisors. 104 Moreover, in the wake of the GFC, finance students should be exposed to the cross-disciplinary complexity of contemporary financial products-not only so that in later practice when to engage a lawyer, specialist tax accountant or specialist merchant banker for advice, but also so that they can explain to such advisors the underlying mechanics of complex financial instruments and transactions, to enable the provision of meaningful and accurate legal or taxation advice. 105 Financial product complexity will not diminish-if anything, investment products will continue to become even more complex and sophisticated. Yet we do insufficient service to our students if all we can tell them is that ongoing innovation in securitisation will ensure that financial products may well be very different shortly after they graduate. The answer, then, lies with enhancing reducing uncertainty and ignorance through education and true learning, with a multi-disciplinary approach involving finance, law, accounting and economics. More than 15 years ago, Brennan highlighted the importance of attention to institutional detail. 106 In educational terms, if we do nothing else, we must surely produce graduates with the wherewithal:
• after a careful reading of relevant disclosure documents associated with such products (e.g. information memoranda, which can readily be 103. The success of virtually all sophisticated financial investment products and transactions in practice depends on interconnected chains (networks) of financiers, equitable security assignees, trustees and beneficiaries, insurers and sub-insurers. Like many networks, these contractual networks can be subject to spillovers and contagion, the effects of which are magnified because of the interdependencies within the network. Investors in sophisticated securities, for example, cannot -because of privity of contract -demand to see the books of the "sub-sub-sub-insurer" who will ultimately indemnify the issuer's obligations to pay the interest due to them; or the remuneration contracts of those insurance executives who advise their Boards to sign off on the "sub-sub-sub-insurance" contract -yet the viability of the securities as an investment is often thoroughly dependent on them. 104. Academic reticence to do so may perhaps be explained by ethical concerns; or information asymmetry on the part of the lecturer. The latter is readily rectified. And as for academic concerns about the ethics of teaching students about wealth transfers, it may be that publicity is the best prophylactic to unethical behaviour. 105. Lawyers or tax accountants are specialists in law or tax accounting, but not necessarily in finance. There is a view, widely held in practice, that one of the main reasons for engaging legal or accounting advisors is to transfer risk from the financier to their lawyers or tax accountants. Sadly, such views are generally mistaken -lawyers (and accountants, though admittedly less so based on some high profile legal cases involving them) are past masters at transferring the risk right back again. 106. Brennan -synthesize or put together these fundamental building blocks in a novel way to develop new products and investment perspectives consistent with corporate finance law;
• to appreciate that financial investment, financing and dividend decisions are constrained by the law, including -fiduciary and statutory duties such as conflicts of interest, duty of care and skill, profit from position and information; insider trading and market manipulation regulation;
-mandatory fundraising disclosure regulation (it is, after all, the law that keeps financial markets informationally efficient);
-the moral hazard of limited liability conferred by corporations legislation, and the checks and balances which become necessary as a consequence, including the outcomes of regulatory gaming in relation to trusts and other forms of asset protection for management and directors;
• to identify and understand so-called Ponzi schemes and the wealth transfers they involve between stakeholder groups in financial practice; and
• to understand and think critically about the role of professional ethical responsibilities in finance and financial planning-e.g. is it morally ethical to engineer the transfer of wealth from one class of security holders to another, or from one class of security holders to management; or for management and directors to use other people's (banks', large vs. small investors') money to take on high risk projects, when management and directors have asset protection-including the use of family discretionary trusts and phoenix companies-that effectively give them a call option in terms of their personal wealth (i.e.
limited downside and unlimited upside potential)? 107 Arguably, ethics should be embedded in an integrated, applied way in the curriculum, rather than as a "six week, stand alone" component of the course. Subjects on ethical investing (or, as North Americans term it, socially responsible investing) could also fruitfully be introduced as they have in some universities such as Griffith in Australia.
Should such reforms of finance curricula be left to the postgraduate years? Assuming that usefulness of finance curricula and enhancing all graduates' understandings of praxis are relevant criteria, the better answer would appear to be that these aspects of "real world" finance should be learned in the undergraduate years-perhaps a final year "capstone" course-rather than left until postgraduate study. This is for two reasons. Firstly, most students do not undertake in depth postgraduate study, while all are-by definition-at least exposed to undergraduate programs. 108 Secondly, if the tenor of the Federal Government's Inquiry into Financial Products and Services (Nov. 2009) 109 is accepted, finance graduates need to be more financially literate in these practical aspects now. Pedagogically speaking, the more students are exposed to these concepts, and the quicker, the better.
Finally, if we are learn the lessons of the GFC, it is important that finance students become skilled at recognising and understanding the impacts of different contractual design arrangements, adverse selection, uncertainty, networks, contagion, moral hazard, the cognitive impacts of increased complexity, ethics, and how these apply in financial markets.
Summary and Conclusions
Finance curricula in Universities have been criticized in the financial press in the wake of the GFC. How did we get to this point? In large part (though not exclusively), it is because we currently lack a unified theory that encompasses:
107. John Kenneth Galbraith argued that the "21 st century has a corporate system based on the unrestrained power of self-enrichment"; and described the contemporary corporate world as analogous to a harlot who dresses very nicely: Galbraith, J. K. (2004), The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., pp. 44 and 15-21 respectively. Quaint as it sounds, there is probably a need to address the current lack of a "moral compass" that moral relativism and antinomianism have wrought in the investment community. What is the best way to combat this? Rather than moralise -at the risk of sounding sanctimonious -about the evils of greed, why not teach students about the causes and effects of wealth transfers within and between companies and corporate stakeholders? Publicity may be the best prophylactic to unethical conduct. i. Map the cash flows and wealth transfers between stakeholders in real life sophisticated financial products and transactions, based on publicly available disclosure documents, and if appropriate, re-arrange the cash flows to derive new financial products consistent with corporate finance law; as well as ii. Recognize:
• the moral hazard effects of limited liability conferred by corporations legislation and trust law, and all the checks and balances which become necessary as a consequence;
• Ponzi and other wealth transfer schemes in practice;
• the ethical implications of wealth transfers between stakeholders;
• contagion; and
• incentives for adverse selection and moral hazard.
By doing so, not only would students' learning outcomes be enhanced, but we could be better assured that future students could ultimately help us to articulate a unified finance theory that can better accommodate these salient features of finance in practice.
